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ABSTRACT
Biometric authentication refers to the use of measurable characteristics (or features) of the human body 
to provide secure, reliable and convenient access to a computer system or physical environment. These 
features (physiological or behavioural) are unique to individual subjects because they are usually obtained 
directly from their owner’s body. Multibiometric authentication systems use a combination of two or more 
biometric modalities to provide improved performance accuracy without offering adequate protection 
against security and privacy attacks. This paper proposes a multibiometric matrix transformation based 
technique, which protects users of multibiometric systems from security and privacy attacks. The results 
of security and privacy analyses show that the approach provides high-level template security and user 
privacy compared to previous one-way transformation techniques.   
Keywords: Multibiometric, matrix transformation, performance, privacy, security
INTRODUCTION
Multibiometric authentication systems use 
a combination of two or more biometric 
modalities to verify the identity of users. 
Multibiometric systems can be implemented 
using image and voice data (Nishino et al., 
2012), face and iris (Karmakar & Murphy, 
2014), palm print and iris (Hariprasath & 
Prabakar, 2012), ear and finger knuckle 
images (Tharwat et al., 2012), as well as hand 
vein, iris and fingerprint (Xiuyan et al., 2011). 
Performance evaluation results from these 
studies show that multibiometric systems 
generally have much better recognition 
accuracy than unibiometric approaches. This 
is because multibiometric systems use a richer 
set of inputs that helps to improve recognition 
performance. However, multibiometric 
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approaches face challenges in terms of template security and fusion complexity (Kaur, 3013). 
Multibiometric systems are not exempted from security challenges, such as replay attacks. 
Legitimate users of multibiometric systems also face privacy violations, such as template 
sharing and cross-matching. The risk of identity loss also occurs if an attacker who obtains 
digital versions of users’ biometric data is able to reconstruct original biometric images from 
compromised biometric templates (Feng & Yuen, 2012; Li & Cot, 2011). Loss of identity is 
a severe risk because biometric modalities cannot be easily replaced unlike a password, PIN, 
or chip. This implies that victims will lose two or more biometric means of identity because 
multibiometric systems use at least two or more modalities. This paper addresses security, 
privacy and risk of loss of identity in multibiometric systems by proposing a one-way (or non-
invertible) transformation approach known as matrix transformation. Matrix transformation 
is a simple and effective method that prevents security attacks on multibiometric systems and 
protects users against a privacy violation as well as identity loss. This approach guarantees 
the security of stored biometric data and the privacy of legitimate users, even if protected 
biometric data and security parameters are disclosed to an attacker. This approach also supports 
revocability or template renewability because a new biometric template can be created and 
used to replace the one suspected to have been stolen, corrupted or compromised.
Non-invertible transformation belongs to a general class of techniques known as cancellable 
biometrics, whose goal is to achieve ‘an intentional, repeatable distortion of a biometric signal 
based on a chosen transform’ (Ratha et al, 2001). This provides template security, revocability, 
unlinkability, and resistance to cross-matching attacks. Non-invertible transformations provide 
template security by preventing the recovery of original biometric data from a transformed 
template, even if an attacker knows the transformation parameters. Revocability allows 
administrators to remove a compromised template and reissue a new one based on the same 
biometric data. Template revocability is achieved by changing the transformation parameters 
used for the previous enrolment. Moreover, multiple transformed templates can be constructed 
from a single biometric input of the same subject, which provides unlinkability and prevents 
cross-matching among transformed templates that are stored in multiple databases.
Non-invertible transformation can be divided into two categories, namely image-level 
transforms and feature-level transforms. Image-level transforms, such as grid morphing, block 
permutation (Ratha et al., 2001), blind deconvolution (Campisi & Egiazarian, 2007; He et al., 
2008), block re-mapping, texture warping (Farberbock et al., 2010; Hammerle-Uhl et al., 2009), 
GREY-COMBO (Zuo et al., 2008) and Log-Polar transform (Plesca & Morogan, 2013) are 
used to create an irreversible version of a given biometric image prior to feature extraction. 
Feature-level transformation uses approaches such as Cartesian; polar and functional transforms 
(Ratha et al., 2006; Ratha et al., 2007); revocable biotokens (Boult, 2006; Boult et al., 2007); 
pseudo-random permutations (Grassi & Faundez-Zanuy, 2009); Gaussian distribution (Jeong 
& Teoh, 2010); partial Hadamard matrix (Wang & Hu, 2013); pulse active transform (Safie et 
al., 2014); BIN-COMBO (Zuo et al., 2008); user-specific secret permutations (Rathgeb & Uhl, 
2010); alignment-free adaptive bloom filter (Rathgeb et al., 2014); and the Delaunay triangle 
(Sandhya et al., 2016) to create non-invertible templates from extracted biometric features. A 
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number of techniques, such as user-dependent multi-state discretisation (Teoh et al., 2010), 
a combination of multi-dimensional iris codes, bit permutation and key binding (Ouda et al., 
2011) and spiral cube (Moujahdi et al., 2012) focus on improving the security and recognition 
accuracy of some existing non-invertible transformation techniques.
Definitions
Galois field. A Galois (or finite) field contains a finite number of elements. A Galois field 
consisting of q elements is denoted as gf(q). Formally, a Galois field, gf(pn) is defined in 
Equation 1 as: 
                 (1)
where  and  defines the order of the field or the number of elements in the 
field, p is the characteristic of the field and the degree of polynomial of each element is at most 
n-1 (Benvenuto, 2012). The binary (base-2 number) system represents each value as 0 or 1. 
The binary system provides an alternative way to represent the elements of a Galois field. Each 
decimal element, x of a Galois field, can be expressed in binary as an 2n. That is,
                       (2)
where an is the binary coefficient and n is the degree of the polynomial.
A Galois field of two elements (also known as binary field), (2) , contains values that are 
represented by 0 and 1. The concept of gf(2) is applicable to digital systems (such as computers) 
which represent data and operations in binary (series of 0s and 1s). 
Permutation matrices.  A permutation matrix is a square matrix whose elements are all 0s 
and 1s, with each row and column containing exactly a 1 (Fuzhen, 2011). It is a square matrix 
obtained from an n×n identity matrix by a permutation of rows (Grinshpan, 2011). Formally, 
a permutation is defined in Equation 3 as: 
                      (3)
where π(1),π(2),…,π(m) (1,2,…,m); thus, a permutation matrix can be expressed as 
                 (Berisha et al., 2012).
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Non-Invertible matrices. Given any two square (n×n) matrices A and B, matrix A is said to 
be invertible (non-singular or non-degenerate) if the following condition holds:
                      (4)
where In is an n×n identity matrix and * denotes ordinary matrix multiplication. The matrix B 
referred to as the inverse of A (denoted by A-1) is uniquely determined by A. A square matrix 
which does not satisfy the condition above is said to be non-invertible. Non-invertible matrices 
are also called singular or degenerate matrices. A square matrix is singular if and only if its 
determinant is 0. A square matrix that is not invertible is called singular or degenerate. A square 
matrix is singular if and only if its determinant is 0. A singular matrix is obtained by performing 
a random selection based on a continuous uniform distribution of its entries.
Non-invertible matrices in a Galois field of two elements (or gf(2)) are obtained 
by performing an xor operation on a pair of permutation matrices in gf(2). If
 are two elementary permutation matrices, 
a non-invertible matrix,  is  computed by the operation C=A xor B .  That is,
The matrix is non-invertible because the values for its determinant and inverse are undefined. 
That is, if y=Cx, then x=yC-1. C-1 is undefined. Hence x cannot be computed given the value of y. 
METHODOLOGY
This section discusses the methods used for feature extraction, implementation, performance 
evaluation and security analysis. 
Feature Extraction
Binary feature vectors were extracted directly from pre-processed face images using the rotation 
invariant neighbour-based invariant local binary pattern (RINLBP) technique. RINLBP is 
a hybrid approach which integrates the generic local binary pattern (Ojala et al., 2002) and 
neighbour-based local binary pattern (Hamouchene & Aouat, 2014). The approach improves 
on the generic local binary pattern (LBP) by addressing poor recognition performance due to 
image rotation. The LBP is a texture classification method that combines a set of local texture 
descriptors to provide a global textural representation of an image. The LBP descriptor of a 
local circular region is computed by comparing the value of the central pixel with each of its 
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neighbours. The result of the comparison is 1 if the value of the pixel is greater that the central 
pixel, otherwise the result is 0. LBP is defined in Equation 5 as: 
                      (5)
such that
                       (6)
where
gp is greyscale value of the neighbour pixel,
gc is the value of the central pixel, 
p is the index of the neighbour
R is the radius of the circular region
P is the number of sample points in the neighbourhood of the central pixel
                 (Ojala et al., 2002).
Figure 1 illustrates the operation of the generic LBP.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿!,!
= 𝑠𝑠 𝑔𝑔!
!!!
!!!
− 𝑔𝑔! . 2
!                                                                                                                                               (5)     
 such that                                         
𝑠𝑠(𝑥𝑥) = 1 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0
0 𝑥𝑥 < 0
                                                                                                                     
(6)                                                                                        
  where 
 𝑔𝑔! is greyscale value of the neighbour pixel, 
 𝑔𝑔! is the value of the central pixel,  
𝑝𝑝 is the index of the neighbour 
𝑅𝑅  is the radius of the circular region 
𝑃𝑃 is the number of sample points in the neighbourhood of the central pixel 
(Ojala et al., 2002). 
Figure 1illustrates the operation of the generic LBP. 
 
 
     
 thresholding 
 
 
Local binary pattern: 11010101 
Figure 1. Generic LBP.  
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Figure 1. Generic LBP
The LBP is popular because it is simple to calculate and shows good performance. It is also 
robust against changes in illumination, which leads to changes in the values of pixel intensities. 
This is because features are not represented using the actual pixel values. Rather, they are 
computed by comparing the intensity values of a central pixel and its neighbours. A change 
in intensity value of a central pixel will lead to a corresponding change in the values of the 
neighbour pixels. Neighbour-based LBP (NLBP) compares the pixel value of each neighbour 
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of the central pixel with its next neighbour along the circular region. Neighbour-based LBP 
is defined in Equation 7 as: 
                     (7)
such that
       
where
gp is greyscale value of a neighbour pixel,
gp+1  is the value of the next pixel along the circular region,
p is the index of the neighbour
R is the radius of the circular region
P is the number of sample points in the neighbourhood of the central pixel (Hamouchene & 
Aouat, 2014).
The encoding begins with the topmost left neighbour and follows a clockwise direction (see 
Figure 2). This is unlike the generic LBP, which compares each neighbour with the central 
pixel. The generic LBP and the neighbour-based LBP generate different binary patterns from 
the same pixels.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
       neighbour-based 
            thresholding 
      
                  
NLBP code: 11010100 
Figure 2. Neighbour-based LBP.  
     
The Rotation Invariant Neighbour-based LBP, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅!,! , is defined in Equation 
8 as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅!,!
= 𝑠𝑠 𝑔𝑔!
!!!
!!!
− 𝑔𝑔!!! . 2!"#(!! !,!)                                                                                                  (8) 
 
such that 
12 9 5 
10 8 13 
7 11 6 
1 1 0 
0  1 
0 1 0 
Figure 2. Neighbour-based LBP
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The Rotation Invariant Neighbour-based LBP, RINLBPR,P, is defined in Equation 8 as:
                  (8)
such that
                     (9)
                     (10)
                      (11)
where
gc, gp, gp+1, p, R and P are as previously defined,
d is the index of the neighbour pixel with the highest value, which defines the dominant direction 
in a neighbourhood. RINLBP provides rotation invariance by starting the encoding process 
with the neighbour pixel that has the highest value. This ensures that there is a corresponding 
rotation of the extracted binary pattern whenever the image is rotated.
𝑠𝑠(𝑔𝑔! − 𝑔𝑔!!!) =
1 𝑔𝑔! ≥ 𝑔𝑔!!!
0 𝑔𝑔! < 𝑔𝑔!!!
                                                                                                  
(9)                                                                  
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔! − 𝑔𝑔!                                                                                                            
(10)                                                                          
𝑝𝑝 ∈ (0,1…𝑃𝑃 − 1)                                                                                                                       
(11)       
where 
𝑔𝑔!, 𝑔𝑔!, 𝑔𝑔!!!, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑃𝑃 are as previously defined, 
𝑑𝑑 is the index of the neighbour pixel with the highest value, which defines the 
dominant direction in a neighbourhood. RINLBP provides rotation invariance by 
starting the encoding process with the neighbour pixel that has the highest value. 
This ensures that there is a correspo ding rotation of the extracted binary pattern 
whenever the image is rotated. 
  
       
           RINLBP 
                                                         
                 RINLBP code:  10100110                           RINLBP code: 10100110 
Figure 3. Rotation invariant neighbour-based LBP. 
   
  The image in Figure 3 is rotated through an angle of 90! before applying the 
NLBP technique. The figure shows that RINLBP computes the same binary pattern 
from the original and the rotated images. This shows that image rotation does not 
7 10 12 
11  9 
6 13 5 
12 9 5 
10  13 
7 11 6 
Figure 3. Rotation invariant neighbour-based LBP
The image in Figure 3 is rotated through an angle of 90° before applying the NLBP technique. 
The figur  shows that RINLBP compu es the same binary pattern from the original and the 
rotated images. This shows that image rotation does not affect the value of the binary pattern 
encoded by the RINLBP operator. We resized each face image to 16×8 before applying the 
RINLBP. This enabled us to obtain a 1,024-bit binary representation of the face image.
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Segmentation isolates the iris from other structures that can affect the accuracy of the 
recognition process. This process involves detecting the inner and outer boundaries of the iris 
as well as the eyelids and eyelashes, which can interrupt the circular contour of the limbus 
boundary. The circular Hough transform is used for detecting the iris and pupil boundaries. 
Hough transform is defined as x2+y2=r2, where (x,y) are the coordinates of the centre of the 
iris and pupil and r is the radius of the circular iris/pupillary boundaries. Figure 4 illustrates 
a segmented iris image.
affect the value of the binary pattern encoded by the RINLBP operator. We resized 
each face image to 16×8 before applying the RINLBP. This enabled us to obtain a 
1,024-bit binary representation of the face image. 
     Segmentation isolates the iris from other structures that can affect the 
accuracy of the recognition process. This process involves detecting the inner and 
outer boundaries of t e iris as well as the eyelids and eyelashes, which can 
interrupt the circular c ntour of the limbus boundary. The circular Hough transform 
is used for detecting the iris and pupil boundaries. Hough transform is defined as 
𝑥𝑥! + 𝑦𝑦! = 𝑟𝑟!, where 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦  are the coordinates of the centre of the iris and pupil and 𝑟𝑟 
is the radius of the circular iris/pupillary boundaries. Figure 4 illustrates a segmented 
iris image. 
                             
 
Figure 4. Segmented iris. 
      
  Normalisation addresses variations in pupil size and provides for translation 
and scale invariance in order to ensure that irises of different individuals are 
mapped onto a common domain, since pupil size can vary across subjects. 
Normalisation is defined in Equation 12 as: 
𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥(𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃), 𝑦𝑦(𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃)) → 𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃)                                                                                                       
(12) 
Figure 4. Segmented iris
Normalisation addresses variations in pupil size and provides for translation and scale invariance 
in order to ensure that rises of different individuals are mappe  onto a common domain, since 
pupil size can vary across subjects. Normalisation is defined in Equation 12 as:
                   (12)
such that
                    (13)
                    (14)
where I(x,y) is the iris image, (x,y) denotes the original Cartesian coordinates, (r,θ) are the 
corresponding normalised polar coordinates, (xp,yp) and (xl,yl  are the coordinates of the pupil 
and iris boundaries along the θ direction (Masek, 2003). Normalisation is usually carried out 
using the rubber sheet (Daugman, 2002) model. The rubber sheet model is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Each point within the Cartesian coordinate is translated to a pair of polar coordinates (r, θ), 
where r lies within the range [0, 1] and θ is an angle in the range [0,2π]. Figure 6 illustrates a 
normalised iris image.
The rubber sheet model produces normalised irises of fixed dimension by taking both pupillary 
dilation and variations in pupil size into account. This ensures the extraction of iris codes of 
same dimension even if the size of the pupil varies across different subjects.
 Feature extraction involves the application of a convolution operation to the 1D signals 
(obtained by breaking the 2D normalised iris image) using 1D Gabor wavelets. A Log-Gabor 
filter is defined in Equation 15 as: 
                     (15)
where f0 is the frequency and σ is the bandwidth of the filter (Field, 1987). The frequency 
response determines whether a given frequency value is quantised as 0 or 1. Feature extraction 
produces a binary template containing a number of bits of information that represent the iris 
image. The total number of bits in the template is two times the product of the angular resolution, 
the radial resolution and the number of filters used. A 1024-bit iris code is obtained by setting 
the values of angular resolution, radial resolution and filter to 8, 128 and 1, respectively.
The feature level fusion technique was used to create multibiometric templates from 
binary face and iris features. The process was carried out by transforming the templates into 
row vectors and appending one at the end of the other. That is,
                    (16)
where MultiBio, FeatFace and FeatIris are the multibiometric, face and iris feature vectors, 
respectively.
such that 
 𝑥𝑥 𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃 = 1− 𝑟𝑟 𝑥𝑥! 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥!(𝜃𝜃)                                                                                        
(13) 𝑦𝑦 𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃 = 1− 𝑟𝑟 𝑦𝑦! 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦!(𝜃𝜃)                                                                                       
(14) where 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) is the iris image, (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) denotes the original Cartesian 
coordinates, (𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃) are the corresponding normalised polar coordinates, 𝑥𝑥!,𝑦𝑦!  
and 𝑥𝑥! ,𝑦𝑦!  are the coordinates of the pupil and iris boundaries along the θ 
direction (Masek, 2003). Normalisation is usually carried out using the rubber 
sheet (Daugman, 2002) model. The rubber sheet model is illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Rubber sheet model. 
 
Each point within the Cartesian coordinate is translated to a pair of polar 
coordinates (r, θ), where r lies within the range [0, 1] and θ is an angle in the range 
[0,2π]. Figure 6 illustrates a normalised iris image. 
 
 
Figure 6. Polar iris image without noise. 
 
Figure 5. Rubber sheet model
such that 
 𝑥𝑥 𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃 = 1− 𝑟𝑟 𝑥𝑥! 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥!(𝜃𝜃)                                                                                        
(13) 𝑦𝑦 𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃 = 1− 𝑟𝑟 𝑦𝑦! 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦!(𝜃𝜃)                                                                                       
(14) where 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) is the iris image, (𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) denotes the original Cartesian 
coordinates, (𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃) are the corresponding normalised polar coordinates, 𝑥𝑥!,𝑦𝑦!  
and 𝑥𝑥! ,𝑦𝑦!  are the coordinates of the pupil and iris boundaries along the θ 
direction (Masek, 2003). Normalisation is usually carried out using the rubber 
sheet (Daugman, 2002) model. The rubber sheet model is illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Rubber sheet model. 
 
Each point within the Cartesian coordinate is translated to a pair of polar 
coordinates (r, θ), where r lies within the range [0, 1] and θ is an angle in the range 
[0,2π]. Figure 6 illustrates a normalised iris image. 
 
 
Figure 6. Polar iris image without noise. 
 
Figure 6. Polar iris image without noise
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Implementation
The algorithm in Figure 7 describes the procedure for creating the transformation matrix.
 The algorithm in Figure 7 describes the procedure for creating the transformation 
matrix. 
 
Algorithm 1: Computation of transformation matrix 
Input 𝑃𝑃 
For k = 1 to 2 
      Read i, j 
     𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑖) ↔ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑖 ± 𝑗𝑗) 
     Output 𝑚𝑚!, 𝑚𝑚! 
      𝑀𝑀! = 𝑚𝑚!  ⊕𝑚𝑚! 
End 
 
Figure 7. Algorithm for computation of transformation matrix. 
 
Each elementary permutation matrix is computed by randomly selecting and 
interchanging a pair of rows of a general permutation matrix. Generally, a total of 
𝑛𝑛! elementary permutation matrices can be computed from an 𝑛𝑛×𝑛𝑛 general 
permutation matrix. The combination of two elementary permutation matrices 
(from a given set of 𝑛𝑛! elementary permutation matrices) to obtain a non-invertible 
matrix produces a total of 𝑛𝑛!
2
 = 𝑛𝑛!!! =
!! !
!!!! !!
=
!! !!!!  …  !!!!!!
!!
 non-invertible 
matrices. The non-invertible matrix (or transformation key), 𝑀𝑀! is created by 
XORing two elementary permutation matrices, 𝑚𝑚! and 𝑚𝑚!. That is,  
Figure 7. Algorithm for computation of transformation matrix
Each elementary permutation matrix is computed by rand mly selecting and interchanging a 
pair of rows of a general permutation matrix. Generally, a total of n! elementary permutation 
matrices can be computed from an n×n general permutation matrix. The combination of two 
elementary permutation mat ices (fro  a given set of n! eleme tary permutation matrices) to 
obtain a non-invertible matrix produces a total of  =  
non-invertible matrices. The non-invertible matrix (or transformation key), MT is created by 
XORing two elementary permutation matrices, m1 and m2. That is, 
                      (17)
The binary string, X (that is, the r ference biometric template) is first converted into a one-
dimensional column vector. A non-invertible t mplate, XT , is created by multiplying the 
transformation matrix, MT , with the column vector representing X. That is,
                      (18)
The transformed template, XT , is stored in the database instead of the original feature vector, 
X. The algorithm for enrolment is shown in Figure 8.
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The algorithm in Figure 9 describes the procedure for authentication. 
𝑀𝑀! = 𝑚𝑚! 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 𝑚𝑚!                                                                                                                      
(17) 
The binary string, 𝑋𝑋 (that is, the reference biometric template) is first converted 
into a one-dimensional column vector. A non-invertible template, 𝑋𝑋! , is created 
by multiplying the transformation matrix, 𝑀𝑀! , with the column vector representing 
𝑋𝑋. That is, 
𝑋𝑋! = 𝑀𝑀! ∗ 𝑋𝑋                                                                                                                              
(18) 
The transformed template, 𝑋𝑋! , is stored in the database instead of the original 
feature vector, 𝑋𝑋. The algorithm for enrolment is shown in Figure 8. 
Algorithm 2: Enrolment 
Input 𝑀𝑀!, 𝑁𝑁 
For all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 
      Read 𝑋𝑋! 
       𝑋𝑋!! = 𝑀𝑀! ∗ 𝑋𝑋! 
End 
Figure 8. Algorithm for enrolment.  
     
The algorithm in Figure 9 describes the procedure for authentication.  
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Input 𝑀𝑀!, 𝑁𝑁 
For all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 
      Read 𝑌𝑌!, 𝑋𝑋!!  
      𝑌𝑌!! = 𝑀𝑀! ∗ 𝑌𝑌! 
      Z=hamming (𝑋𝑋!! ,𝑌𝑌!!) 
      If 𝑍𝑍 < 𝜌𝜌 then 
            accept 
     Else  
            reject 
 End 
Figure 9. Algorithm for authentication. 
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of 108 subjects (or users) from CASIA Near Infrared face database (Li et al., 2007) and 
CASIA iris image database version 1 
(biometrics.idealtest.org/dbDetailForUser.do?id=2), respectively. An additional dataset 
consisting of 196 face images of 100 subjects obtained from Labeled Faces in the Wild 
(Huang et al., 2008) was also used to evaluate the recognition accuracy of the proposed 
approach. The recognition accuracy was reported in terms of false acceptance rate (FAR) 
and false rejection rate (FRR). False rejection results from a situation where the 
Hamming Distance between a pair of same-user templates is greater than the threshold. 
False acceptance occurs when the hamming distance between a pair of transformed 
templates belonging to different users is less than the threshold. The threshold used for 
the experiments was 0.30. The justification for the choice of this value is explained as 
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(17) 
The binary string, 𝑋𝑋 (that is, the reference biometric template) is first converted 
into a one-dimensional column vector. A non-invertible template, 𝑋𝑋! , is created 
by multiplying the transformation matrix, 𝑀𝑀! , with the column vector representing 
𝑋𝑋. That is, 
𝑋𝑋! = 𝑀𝑀! ∗ 𝑋𝑋                                                                                                                              
(18) 
The transformed template, 𝑋𝑋! , is stored in the database instead of the original 
feature vector, 𝑋𝑋. The algorithm for enrolment is shown in Figure 8. 
Algorithm 2: Enrolme t 
Input 𝑀𝑀!, 𝑁𝑁 
For all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 
      Read 𝑋𝑋! 
       𝑋𝑋!! = 𝑀𝑀! ∗ 𝑋𝑋! 
End 
Figure 8. Algorithm for enrolment.  
     
The algorithm in Figure 9 describes the procedure for authentication.  
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Performance Evaluation
The performance of the scheme was evaluated using 756 face images and 756 iris images of 
108 subjects (or users) from CASIA Near Infrared face database (Li et al., 2007) and CASIA 
iris image database version 1 (biometrics.idealtest.org/dbDetailForUser.do?id=2), respectively. 
An additional dataset consisting of 196 face images of 100 subjects obtained from Labeled 
Faces in the Wild (Huang et al., 2008) was also used to evaluate the recognition accuracy of 
the proposed approach. The recognition accuracy was reported in terms of false acceptance 
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rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR). False rejection results from a situation where the 
Hamming Distance between a pair of same-user templates is greater than the threshold. False 
acceptance occurs when the hamming distance between a pair of transformed templates 
belonging to different users is less than the threshold. The threshold used for the experiments 
was 0.30. The justification for the choice of this value is explained as follows. The range of 
intra-class variation between iris textures of the same person is 10-20% whereas irises of 
different subjects differ by 40-60% (Hao et al., 2006). This means that a threshold of at most 
20% or 0.20 would effectively discriminate same-person iris images from those of different 
subjects. The same threshold was applied to face and multibiometric data in order to provide 
a fair comparison of the performance of the matrix transformation technique on different 
biometric modalities.
Table 1 presents the performance evaluation results for the application of matrix 
transformation on face images obtained from CASIA Near Infra Red (NIR) database. 
Table 1 
Performance results – Matrix Transformation (Face – CASIA NIR database) 
Hamming distance Recognition accuracy (%)
FRR FAR
0.20 4.629 78
0.25 0.231 99
0.30 0.0 100
0.35 0.0 100
Results in the table show that FRR decreases as the hamming distance increases while FAR 
increases with a corresponding increase in threshold value. This is because an increase in 
hamming distance lowers the rate at which legitimate users are treated as impostors but with 
an increase in the number of impostors who are accepted as valid users. Conversely, a lower 
hamming distance results in an increase in FRR and a reduction in FAR. That is, there is more 
likelihood for legitimate users to be regarded as impostors and less likelihood for impostors to 
be accepted as valid users. An increase in hamming distance results in low intra-class variation 
and low inter-class distance. That is, there is higher correlation among the biometric data of 
same subjects and less variation among the biometric data of different subjects. 
Table 2 shows the performance evaluation results for the application of matrix 
transformation on face images obtained from Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset.
Table 2 
Performance results – Matrix Transformation (Face – LFW database) 
Hamming distance Recognition accuracy (%)
FRR FAR
0.20 0.0 14.4
0.25 0.0 33.1
0.30 0.0 88.9
0.35 0.0 100
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The table shows that the FRR for all the Hamming distance values was 0%. This implies 
that a high correlation exists among face images of same users. The FAR increases with a 
corresponding increase in Hamming distance. A high Hamming distance value increases the 
collision among biometric data of different subjects. This leads to an increase in the rate at 
which impostors are accepted as valid users. A comparison of the results in Tables 1 and 2 
shows that the proposed approach has better recognition accuracy for the LFW dataset than 
it does for the CASIA NIR database. This is because the LFW dataset consists of colour 
images while the CASIA NIR database contains greyscale images. The LBP and its variants 
have better recognition accuracy on colour images than greyscale images (Choi et al., 2012). 
However, both tables show that matrix transformation has low FRR (between 0% and ~4.63) 
but an intolerable FAR (between 14.4% and 100%). Hence, it is difficult to plot a suitable ROC 
curve based on the performance results obtained. This implies that the application of matrix 
transformation on face modality has poor recognition accuracy based on the chosen hamming 
distance values. Finding optimal hamming distance values required for good recognition 
accuracy for face (or any biometric) is outside the scope of this work. The focus of the work 
was to provide a fair comparison of the recognition performance of matrix transformation on 
face, iris and multibiometric data.
The result of the application of matrix transformation on iris data is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 
Performance results – Matrix Transformation (Iris) 
Hamming distance Recognition accuracy (%)
FRR FAR
0.20 64.35 0
0.25 32.02 0
0.30 8.769 0.007
0.35 1.466 0.139
The table shows that FRR decreases from 64.35% to 1.466% as the hamming distance 
increases from 0.20 to 0.35. On the other hand, the FAR increases from 0% to 0.139% for 
the chosen hamming distance values. Increasing the hamming distance results in lower intra-
class variations among the biometric data of same subjects and higher correlation among the 
data of different subjects. Low intra-class variation leads to the rejection of fewer valid users 
(lower false rejection) and acceptance of more impostors (higher false acceptance). Moreover, 
increasing the hamming distance allows more impostors to be accepted as valid users and fewer 
valid users to be treated as impostors.
Figure 10 is the ROC curve for the application of matrix transformation technique on iris 
templates. The graph illustrates the relationship between FAR and FRR for different values 
of Hamming distance.
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The maximum value of FRR is approximately 64.4% and the minimum value of FRR is 
slightly below 1.47%. FAR has a maximum value of about 0.14% and a minimum value of 
approximately 0%. The curve shows that FRR reduces as FAR increases and vice versa. The 
value of FAR for each hamming distance is lower than the corresponding value of FRR. This 
implies that the approach sacrifices recognition accuracy and user convenience for security. 
Table 4 shows the performance evaluation results for the application of matrix 
transformation on multibiometric data. 
 
Figure 10. ROC curve for matrix transformation (iris). 
The maximum value of FRR is approximately 64.4% and the minimum value of 
FRR is slightly below 1.47%. FAR has a maximum value of about 0.14% and a 
minimum value of approximately 0%. The curve show  that FRR reduces as FAR 
increases and vice versa. The value of FAR for each hamming distance is lower than the 
corresponding value of FRR. This implies that the approach sacrifices recognition 
accuracy and user convenience for security.  
Table 4 shows the performance evaluation results for the application of matrix 
transformation on multibiometric data.  
	  
Figure 10. ROC curve for matrix transformation (iris)
Table 4 
Performance results – Matrix Transformation (Multibiometric) 
Hamming distance Recognition accuracy (%)
FRR FAR
0.20 29.78 0.007
0.25 19.75 0.46
0.30 10.42 5.17
0.35 4.93 20.67
The FRR for the lowest hamming distance is ~29.8% while the highest hamming distance 
value has a false rejection rate of ~4.9%. Increasing the hamming distance leads to a reduction 
in both intra-class variation and inter-class distance. In other words, the rate at which genuine 
users are treated as impostors reduces with a corresponding increase in hamming distance. On 
the other hand, an increase in hamming distance results in the acceptance of more impostors as 
valid users. A lower hamming distance results in the rejection of more genuine users (higher 
FRR) and the acceptance of fewer impostors (lower FAR).
The relationship between the false rejection rate and false acceptance rate based on the 
application of matrix transformation on multibiometric data is illustrated by the ROC curve 
in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. ROC curve for matrix transformation (multibiometric). 
The maximum value of FAR is ~20.7% and the minimum value is ~0.007%. FRR has 
maximum and minimum values of approximately 29.8% and 4.9%, respectively. The 
curve shows that the FRR for each threshold is higher than the corresponding FAR. This 
implies that a higher premium is placed on security than on user convenience. 
Security Analysis 
The security of the proposed scheme was analysed using selected parameters, such as 
key length, key space, entropy and probability of correct guess in order to determine its 
resistance to security attacks (such as guessing and key exhaustion), privacy attacks 
(such as record multiplicity and cross matching) and template reconstruction attack.  
Key length is the number of bits in the transformation key. It is expressed as the 
square of the dimension of the transformation matrix. Key length, 𝐾𝐾! , is defined in 
Equation 19 as:  
Figure 11. ROC curve for matrix transformation (multibiometric)
The maximum value of FAR is ~20.7% and the minimum value is ~0.007%. FRR has maximum 
and minimum values of approximately 29.8% and 4.9%, respectively. The curve shows that 
the FRR for each threshold is higher than the corresponding FAR. This implies that a higher 
premium is placed on security than on user convenience.
Security Analysis
The security of the proposed scheme was analysed using selected par meters, such as key 
length, key space, ent opy and probability of correct guess in o der to determine its resistance 
to security attacks (such as guessing and key exhaustion), privacy attacks (such as record 
multiplicity and cross matching) and template reconstruction attack. 
Key length is the number of bits in the transformation key. It is expressed as the square of the 
dimension of the transformation matrix. Key length, Kl , is defined in Equation 19 as: 
                       (19)
where n is the dimension of the transformation matrix. 
∴ key length 220= 1,048,576 bits. These keys are long enough to prevent guessing attack.
Key space, Kspace , is computed using the formula:
                   (20)
where n is the dimension of the transformation key.
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The value of n used for the experiments is 1024. 
          
        (  is the symbol for much greater than)
The large key space prevents exhaustive search and cross-matching attacks.
Entropy, is expressed in Equation 21 as:
                     (21)
where N is the symbol count and K is the key length (Shannon, 1948). 
The value of key length is 220 (or 1,048,576) bits
∴H=log221048576 = 1,048,576 bits. 
This is prohibitively large enough to prevent an attacker from carrying out a random guessing 
attack against the authentication system.
The probability of correct guess, Pr (guess) , measures the possibility that an attacker will 
guess a transformation key correctly. It is expressed as the inverse of the key space, Kspace . 
That is, 
                     (22)
 0. The probability of guessing a transformation key is very low (much 
less than 0). 
Theoretical analysis of irreversibility is used to determine the complexity of recovering an 
original biometric data from a transformed template and the transformation parameter. The 
analysis is presented as follows.
Consider a 4×4 general permutation matrix,
          
An elementary permutation matrix, pa , is obtained by interchanging the first and second rows 
of P. That is,
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The second elementary permutation matrix, pb , is obtained by interchanging the third and 
fourth rows of P. That is,
        
The transformation matrix or key, is computed by the operation pa xor pb. Hence,
          
Now consider a one-dimensional column vector, x = . The transformed template Y is 
computed by the multiplication operation, y = Rx. That is, 
       
The non-invertible analysis is carried out based on two scenarios, namely, “with respect to R 
scenario” (that is, when an attacker knows the transformation key) and “with respect to without 
R scenario” (that is, when an attacker does not have access to the transformation key).
(a) Non-invertible analysis with respect to R scenario
x =  , where R is the transformation matrix and y is the transformed template.
=R-1y 
Recall that R = 
 
hence R-1 = 
The inverse of R is undefined because R is a singular matrix. That is, the determinant of R, 
det(R) = 0.
An alternative approach is to attempt to recover x from R and y using a system of simultaneous 
equations constructed from R and y (Li & Hu, 2013). Based on the example above, we attempt 
to retrieve the original biometric vector. 
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x =  from the matrix R =  and transformed template y = 
using a system of linear equations
                     (23)
                     (24)
                     (25)
                     (26)
The solutions for the equation will be the original biometric vector x = 
By eliminating the variables containing 0, we have
                      (27)
                      (28)
                       (29)
                       (30)
Using Equation 27 and 28,
                     (from Equation 27)
Substituting for x3 in Equation 28, we have
         
Moreover, x4= 1 - x3                (from Equation 28)
Substituting for x4 in Equation 27, we have
      1 -x3 + x3 = 1 or 1 - 0 = 1.
Using Equation 29 and 30,
      x1 = 1- x2                (from Equation 29)
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Substituting for x1 in equ. 30, we have
      1 - x2 + x2 = 1 or 1 - 0 = 1
Moreover, x2 = 1 - x1                (from Equation 30)
Substituting for x2 in Equation 29, we have
      1 - x1 + x1 = 1 or 1 - 0 = 1
The result in all cases is 1. But we do not know which variable has the value of 1. This makes 
it difficult to assign values to each xi in x = 
Hence, it is impossible to retrieve x from y even if R is known.
(b) Non-invertible analysis with respect to without R scenario
In this case, only the transformed template y =  is available. 
A compromise of the authentication scheme will require two steps:
(i) An attacker will have to generate all possible values of x. Each x is an n×1 dimensional 
vector, where n is the number of bits in the compromised transformed template. This 
requires an effort of n!
(ii) Each x is transformed using each of the possible values of R. 
 This requires an effort of  
 For n! vectors, the total effort required = 
(iii) Each transformed x is compared with the compromised y resulting in an effort of 
(iv) A match between a transformed x and a compromised y indicates that both of them 
are generated from the same feature vector.
The complexity of this analysis is defined in terms of the total effort required to obtain all 
possible transformed values of x (exhaustive search) and to match each transformed x with a 
compromised y
 
Using this approach for a 4-bit template, we substitute n = 4. 
Jegede, A., Udzir, N. I., Abdullah, A. and Mahmod, R.
152 Pertanika J. Sci. & Technol. 26 (1): 133 - 160 (2018)
The total effort required  = 6.768×1023 iterations.
Table 5 illustrates the relationship between the dimension of biometric data and complexity 
of an exhaustive search attack.
Table 5 
Relationship between dimension of biometric data and complexity of an exhaustive search attack  
Length of biometric template (n) Complexity of operation (iterations)
4 6.768×1023
5 6.80×10198
6 overflow
1024 overflow
The complexity of irreversibility with respect to without R scenario increases as the dimension 
of biometric data increases. Matrix transformation uses a 1024-bit template, which makes it 
computationally infeasible to retrieve an original template from only its transformed version.
Privacy Analysis
The privacy capability of matrix transformation is analysed using the requirements proposed 
in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 (BioKeySIII Final Report, 2011) standard. These include 
irreversibility, unlinkability, confidentiality and data minimisation.
Irreversibility analysis. With respect to matrix transformation, irreversibility is defined in 
terms of the difficulty an attacker faces in an attempt to recover original biometric data, from a 
transformed template, Y. Detailed analysis of irreversibility has been using both “with respect 
to R and without R” scenarios. The analysis shows that an attacker faces a computationally 
difficult task in an attempt to recover original biometric data from a transformed template.  
Unlinkability analysis. This is used to determine the effort (computational complexity) 
required to match biometric references across multiple databases or applications. A pair of 
biometric data is ‘linkable’ if it is possible to establish that they are obtained from the same 
user. The analysis of unlinkability is carried out by considering both the average case and 
worst-case scenarios.
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Average case. The average case involves matching a compromised template with only half of 
the possible instances of transformed templates. The effort required, ECM
       
By substituting n = 1024, we have 
 1024! iterations
Worst case. This involves matching all possible instances of transformed templates. The effort 
required, ECM
       
 1024! iterations. 
The effort required when the entire transformed templates is matched is twice that which is 
required for matching only half of the transformed templates. However, the effort in both cases 
is in excess of 1024! iterations. This is prohibitively large enough to prevent a cross-matching 
attack in matrix transformation.
Confidentiality analysis. A secured template, y is created by applying a transformation matrix, 
on a biometric data, x. That is,
      
The transformed template is stored in the database while the original biometric data,  , is 
discarded. The example above shows that the transformed template, y =  is distinguishable 
from the original biometric data, x = . In other words, the transformation operation uses R 
to conceal x in y.
Data minimisation.  Matrix transformation stores only transformed templates,  , and possibly 
the transformation key, R. Sensitive biometric data that may violate users’ privacy are not 
retained in the authentication system during enrolment and authentication.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Results in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show that matrix transformation has low FRRs (between 0% and 
~4.63%) when it is applied to face biometric than it does when applied to iris or multibiometric 
modality. However, this is achieved at the expense of intolerably high FARs (between 14.4% 
and 100%). This is due to the low inter-class distance among face images of different subjects 
(Wu & Yuan, 2010). High FARs also imply a high correlation among transformed templates 
of different users for the chosen hamming distance values. Low FRR and high FAR imply 
high usability (or user convenience) and low security. The application of matrix transformation 
on iris results in high FRRs of 64.35% and 32.02% for hamming distance values of 0.20 and 
0.25, respectively. However, the FARs recorded for both hamming distance values is 0%. 
Increasing the hamming distance values to 0.30 and 0.35 results in improvements in recognition 
accuracy as the FRRs reduce to 8.796% and 1.466%, respectively. The FAR also increases 
from 0% to 0.007% and 0.139% for the respective hamming distance values. This implies that 
hamming distance values of 0.30 and 0.35 provides a good balance between security and user 
convenience in an iris-based matrix transformation scheme. Applying matrix transformation 
on multibiometric data results in high FRRs of 29.78%, 19.75% and ~10.42% for hamming 
distances of 0.20, 0.25 and 0.30, respectively. Increasing the hamming distance to 0.35 
results in a lower FRR (~4.9%) and high FAR (~20.67%). Results from experiments show 
that the matrix transformation has better recognition accuracy when applied to iris biometric 
(especially at hamming distances of 0.30 and 0.35) than it does when it is applied to face or 
multibiometric data. The iris is a more reliable biometric modality because it exhibits low 
intra-class variation and high inter-class distance (Bowler et al., 2007). Matrix transformation 
also achieves improved performance results when it is applied to multibiometric modality than 
it does when face modality is used. This is because the presence of iris bits in multibiometric 
templates minimises the impact of the pervasiveness of the face on the recognition accuracy 
of the system. Security analysis shows that matrix transformation has long key length, large 
key space, high key entropy and low probability of correct guess of the key. Thus, matrix 
transformation is resistant to random guessing and exhaustive search attacks. Privacy analysis 
shows that matrix transformation provides irreversibility, confidentiality and data minimisation. 
The complexity of unlinkability analysis in matrix transformation is very high. This enables 
the approach to provide sufficient resistance against cross-matching attacks. Irreversibility 
prevents the recovery of original biometric data from transformed templates. Legitimate users 
are protected against loss of identity as attackers cannot reconstruct actual biometric images 
from compromised biometric templates.
A comparison of the recognition accuracy of the proposed matrix transformation and 
related works is presented in Table 6. 
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Results from previous works show that the proposed approach has lower recognition 
accuracy than the previous works. The alteration of the bits in the original template makes 
matching difficult in the transformation domain. Hamming distance provides limited error 
correction capability because it corrects only bit errors and does not address burst errors. The 
long dimension of biometric data (1024 bits) used by matrix transformation imposes a high 
overhead on the error correcting capability of hamming distance and this results in performance 
degradation. However, it is pertinent to mention that the main goal of matrix transformation 
is to provide high template security and user privacy.
Table 7 presents a comparison of the security of the proposed matrix transformation and 
related works. 
Table 6 
Comparison between our approach and previous studies (recognition accuracy)  
Author Technique Dataset Performance (%)
FRR GAR FAR EER
Moujahdi et al., 2012 Spiral cube Yale face 100 0
Zuo et al., 2008 BIN combo 100 0.1
GREY combo MMU1 iris data 
set
99.5 0.01
Our approach Matrix transformation 10 5.5
Hammerle-Uhl et al., 
2009
Block re-mapping 1.2
Image warping 1.3
Rathgeb et al., 2010 User-specific permutation CASIA iris V3 3.821 0
Rathgeb et al., 2014 Alignment-free adaptive 
Bloom filter
2.05 0.01
Our approach Matrix transformation 7.889 2.74
Table 7 
Comparison between our approach and previous studies (security)  
Author Modality Technique Security
Key length
(bits)
Key
Space
Entropy 
(bits)
Pr (correct 
guess)
Zuo et al, 2008 Iris image Grey-combo 260 2260 260 5.39×10-79
Binary iris code Bin-combo 560 2560 560 0
Rathgeb & Uhl, 
2010
Binary iris code User-specific 
permutation
38! 1.91×10-45
Moujahdi et al., 
2012
Face Spiral cube 100200 0
Sandhya et al., 2016 Fingerprint Delaunay 2.5 
billion/
triangle 8.35 
billion
Our approach Face, iris and 
multibiometric
Matrix 
transformation
220 or 
1,048,576
1024! 220 0
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The proposed scheme has much higher key length, larger key space and higher entropy 
than the previous approaches. Its keys also have a much lower probability of correct guess 
compared to the previous schemes. Security and privacy analysis in Sections 5.7 and 5.8 show 
that the level of template security and user privacy provided by a biometric cryptosystem 
depends largely on its key length and key space. The proposed approach has a much higher 
key length and larger key space compared to the previous schemes. Hence, it is more robust 
to security and privacy attacks than existing approaches.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposed and applied the matrix transformation technique to three different 
biometric modalities (face, iris and multibiometric) unlike previous approaches that used only 
one biometric modality. The study highlights the effect of the nature of biometric data on the 
performance accuracy of the proposed approach. Matrix transformation provides high-level 
template security and user privacy compared to other approaches. The low recognition accuracy 
of the proposed multibiometric template protection scheme can be addressed by integrating a 
key binding technique that uses better error correction techniques; This will result in a hybrid 
multibiometric template protection scheme that provides improved template security and user 
privacy without compromising recognition accuracy.
Results from previous works show that the proposed approach has lower recognition 
accuracy than the previous works. The alteration of the bits in the original template makes 
matching difficult in the transformation domain. Moreover, Hamming distance provides limited 
error correction capability. That is, it corrects only bit errors and does not address burst errors. 
The long dimension of biometric data (1024 bits) used by matrix transformation imposes a high 
overhead on the error correcting capability of Hamming distance and this results in performance 
degradation. However, it is pertinent to mention that the main goal of matrix transformation 
is to provide high template security and user privacy.
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